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The Transformation of Employment Regulation in Greece: Towards a 
Dysfunctional Liberal Market Economy? 
 
 
Abstract (123 words) 
  
Since the eruption of the European sovereign debt crisis, the bailout conditions 
imposed to Greece have gradually shifted their emphasis from ‘tidying up’ public 
finances towards ‘improving the competitiveness’ of the economy. The 
employment relations system has been targeted as one of the priority areas for 
reform, which resulted in its gradual dismantling. The article analyses this 
transformation in employment regulation, using insights from the varieties of 
capitalism literature. It is argued that the on-going injection of liberal market 
elements is likely to transform Greece into a dysfunctional Liberal Market 
Economy. The changes ignore the specificities and idiosyncrasies of the Greek 
production model and are likely to leave the country with the ‘worse of both 
worlds’: suboptimal economic performance and diluted social cohesion. 
 
English Summary (210 words) 
  
Since the eruption of the European sovereign debt crisis, the bailout conditions 
imposed to Greece have gradually shifted their emphasis from ‘tidying up’ public 
finances towards ‘improving the competitiveness’ of the economy. In the process, 
collective bargaining has been targeted as one of the priority areas for reform, 
which resulted into a gradual dismantling of the system. The main aim of this 
article is to analyse the changes in the institutional framework of employment 
regulation, using insights from the varieties of capitalism literature. It is argued 
that the on -going injection of liberal market elements in the Greek employment 
system is likely to transform Greece into a dysfunctional Liberal Market 
Economy. The changes in the collective regulation of employment ignore the 
specificities and idiosyncrasies of the Mediterranean model of capitalism and, 
thus, are likely to leave the country with the ‘worse of both worlds’: suboptimal 
economic performance and diluted social cohesion. The article is structured as 
follows. First, the debate on varieties of capitalism is considered in light of the 
global crisis. Second, the basic features of the Greek employment relations’ 
model are being discussed. Third, the transformation of employment regulation 
2 
 
after the bailout is examined. Fourth, the evolution towards a dysfunctional 
Liberal Market Economy is analyzed. The final section concludes. 
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Introduction 
  
The on-going global economic crisis has the potential to destabilize models of 
capitalism, and especially arrangements in the employment relations system. 
Nevertheless, there is little consensus on where the countries are heading, or 
how to conceptualize the current trajectories of change. Before the advent of the 
crisis, institutional change appeared to be slow and incremental (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005) and the pressures of global markets unfolded gradually over time. 
Instead, we now observe that changes are swift and abrupt; global financial 
markets seem able to impose their will on national politics, forcing governments 
to take austerity measures and adopt neoliberal reforms. Thus, the current 
juncture poses important questions for the varieties of capitalism (VoC) 
literature. For example, how did actors in different models of capitalism respond 
and how were these models recalibrated? Were these trajectories of change in 
line with earlier expectations? Is there a reversal or acceleration of the trend 
towards convergence to neo-liberalism? What are the implications for their sub-
systems such as employment regulation? 
 
The answer to these questions differs depending on the case at hand. Despite 
the progress in the literature, there is still considerable debate on the impact of 
the global crisis on institutional arrangements across models of capitalism 
(Hassel, 2012 ; Heyes et al., 2012 ; Lallement, 2011 ; Streeck, 2010). A number of 
recent contributions started examining the impact of the crisis and the politics of 
austerity on public and private sector employment relations in a variety of 
national contexts. Recent articles considered cases such as Ireland (McDonough 
and Dundon, 2010 ; Roche and Teague, 2012), the United Kingdom (Bach, 2012), 
Australia (Colley, 2012), and the United States (Cantin, 2012). 
 
The article contributes to these debates by examining the transformation of 
employment regulation in Greece. The relevance of this case selection is justified 
on several grounds. Greece is one of the countries that felt the repercussions of 
the global crisis very violently. Since the transformation of the US sub -prime 
crisis into a European sovereign debt crisis, the country was forced to follow 
Washington consensus-type policies by the European Union, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank (the so-called Troika), going 
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through an abrupt liberalization process, especially in the labour market realm. 
It is not the purpose of this article to provide a detailed empirical account of 
these changes, because these shifts have been documented elsewhere (see 
Ioannou, 2012, 2013 ; Karamessini, 2012 ; Koukiadaki and Kretsos, 2012). 
Instead, the distinctive contribution of this article is to analyze these changes 
within the conceptual frame offered by the varieties of capitalism literature. 
 
 
Methodologically, the article follows a single case-study research design 
(George and Bennett, 2005). Evidence will be drawn from a variety of secondary 
sources to present the transformation in the employment relations’ realm. The 
case study shows that the institutional changes comprise an increase in ‘hire-
and-fire’ flexibility, a reform of the mediation and arbitration system and a shift 
towards decentralized collective bargaining. The timeframe of the case study 
involves the period right after the first bailout between 2010-2012. The reforms 
in this period transformed radically the institutional framework governing 
employment relations. On the basis of this analysis, it is argued that the injection 
of liberal market elements in the Greek employment system is likely to 
transform the country to a dysfunctional Liberal Market Economy. The changes 
in the collective regulation of employment ignore Greece’s specificities and 
idiosyncrasies and, thus, are likely to leave the country with the worse of both 
worlds: sub-optimal economic performance and diluted social cohesion. 
 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, the debate on varieties of 
capitalism is considered in light of the global crisis. Second, the basic features of 
the Greek employment relations’ model are being discussed. Third, the 
transformation of employment regulation after the bailout is examined. Fourth, 
the evolution towards a dysfunctional Liberal Market Economy is analyzed. The 
final section concludes. 
 
 
Global Crisis and Varieties of Capitalism 
  
Hall and Soskice (2001) suggested that there are two main models of advanced 
capitalist economies: Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) such as Germany, 
Austria or Sweden, and Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) such as the United 
Kingdom, United States and Ireland. According to the VoC framework, the two 
‘institutionally coherent’ models of capitalism were capable of high economic 
performance, because their institutional arrangements were characterized by 
harmonious ‘institutional complementarities’ (Höpner, 2005). The concept 
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denotes tightly coupled institutional arrangements between sub-systems. Thus, 
the employment relations system was not held to operate in a vacuum, but was 
intimately linked to other institutional spheres such as the training system and 
corporate governance. 
 
Admittedly, this neat conceptualization might not hold very well in light of the 
crisis. There is little consensus on where the countries are heading, or how to 
conceptualize the current trajectories of change. Liberal Market Economies, such 
as the UK and the US, responded with Keynesian-style stimulus packages. The 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the ‘nationalizations’ and bailouts of financial 
institutions in the US and the UK blurred the boundaries between different 
models, and global capitalism entered into unchartered territory. Even the 
trajectory of typical Coordinated Market Economies, such as Germany, appears 
puzzling. Streeck (2010) argued that Germany is steadily converging to the 
Liberal Market model shifting from a liberalization mode to a fiscal consolidation 
mode. By contrast, Hassel (2012) interpreted the change as a more subtle 
recalibration of the model, since it quickly recovered with decreasing 
unemployment rates and increasing exports. Notably, working time 
arrangements absorbed most of the pressure to employment. More generally, 
Lallement (2011) argued that the crisis reinforced the differences across models 
of capitalism, and the national responses were in line with established mappings. 
On the other hand, Heyes et al. (2012) argued that the responses to the crisis 
defy established categories and that the VoC framework is unable to account for 
the changes. 
 
The present article contributes to this debate by focusing on the Greek case 
and the changes in the employment relations system. Greece has been a country 
typically grouped under the category of the Mediterranean/Southern European 
model of capitalism (Amable, 2003 ; Hyman, 2004 ; Karamessini, 2008) 
alongside Italy, Spain and Portugal. However, this ideal-type operates at a higher 
level of abstraction and might obscure some of the national-specific features and 
idiosyncrasies. Arguably, Greece is a case that does not sit comfortably among 
the conventional typologies of capitalist or employment models. Zambarloukou 
(2006) assigns Greece to the ‘state capitalism’ model, whereas Featherstone 
(2008) critically discusses the relevance of various ideal-types for the case of 
Greece, and sees the ‘Mixed Market Economies’ conceptualization as the most 
relevant one. Finally, Karamessini (2009) offers a detailed historical account of 
the Greek employment model -including the employment relations system, 
training system and welfare regime. She employs the term ‘liberal de-
familialized capitalism’ to characterise the current trajectory, and the changing 
role of the state in the economy. In this context, the next section elaborates on 
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the historical features of the Greek employment model, before examining the 
recent changes in employment regulation. 
 
 
The Greek Employment Relations Model 
  
With regards to Greek employment relations, the state’s direct intervention in 
the management of the system is well documented. The attempt of the state to 
control the trade unions dates back to the late 1920s and persisted – in different 
forms – throughout the post -war period, creating thus a subversive union 
mentality (Koukoules, 1995 ; Livieratos, 2006). Although a large number of 
tripartite consultative bodies were successively introduced in the post-war 
period, their influence in shaping economic and social policy remained marginal 
(Ioannou, 2000). National collective bargaining agreements were sanctioned by 
the state and disagreements were settled through compulsory arbitration. The 
employment relations system in the post-war era was dubbed as ‘state 
corporatism’ albeit ‘asymmetric’ (Lavdas, 2005:306). Even after the collapse of 
the military junta, in 1974, and the subsequent democratization of the trade 
union movement in the early 1980s, the organic relationship of the unions with 
the political parties remained intact. The political manipulation of the unions 
was further accentuated by the fact that they never achieved economic 
independence, since their activities were partially funded by the state 
(Koukoules, 1994 ; Kouzis, 2007). 
 
Additionally, high levels of industrial conflict characterized the Greek 
employment relations system. Although since the mid-1990s strike frequency 
has decreased (Karamessini, 2009), Greece still remains the country with the 
highest number of general strikes in the EU, attesting to the system’s militant 
nature (Hamann et al., 2013 ; Lindvall, 2013). This militancy, however, is usually 
observed in the public sector and in particular segments of the private sector. 
Trade union density in Greece remains rather low, and certainly below the EU-15 
average, as Figure 1 shows. 
 
 
Figure 1: Trade Union Density in Greece and the EU-15 (1977-2008) 
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Since 1980 union membership experienced a slow but steady decline. The low 
membership can be partly explained by the productive structure of Greek 
capitalism. The plethora of employees in small and micro-firms in Greece cannot 
be formally represented by unions, merely due to the legal prerequisite for union 
establishment, which is to have at least 21 members. As a result, employees in 
about 97% of private firms are not eligible to establish a trade union (Kouzis, 
1998 ; Matsaganis, 2007). Other explanations for the low membership and 
density is perhaps the weakness of union organizing strategies, as well as the 
unions’ strategic choice to concentrate their pressure on the state, reflecting the 
state-dependent development of trade unionism in Greece.  
While union density in Greece is steadily falling since the 1990s, the collective 
bargaining coverage is estimated to stand at about 70% (Table 1). In other 
words, the erga omnes extension of the collective agreements means that 
employees from a wide range of sectors and occupations are de facto covered by 
the terms and conditions of collective agreements, even without being formally 
members of any affiliate union. 
 
 
Table 1. Collective Bargaining Coverage and Centralization (1991-2006) 
 
  1990 1995 2005 2008 
 Collective Bargaining Coverage (%) 65% 65% 65% 65% 
 Source:     
 Collective Bargaining Centralization Index 0.292 0.344 0.334 0.334 
Visser (2013). 
 
The data on Table 1 paint a picture of the institutional characteristics of Greek 
employment relations. On the one hand, indices of wage bargaining 
centralization rank quite high, reflecting CME-levels of centralization. Similarly, 
collective bargaining coverage is also high reflecting the automatic extension of 
collective agreements. However, these characteristics fall short of producing any 
notable ‘institutional complementarity’, due to the prevalence of SMEs, the 
persistence of the informal economy, and the weak institutions of workplace 
8 
 
representation. 
 
Indeed, workplace representation has been almost inexistent until recently. In 
the post-1974 period, a movement of ‘factory councils’ emerged spontaneously, 
but collapsed in the following years, as it encountered hostility both from the 
Communist Party and the peak employers’ confederation (SEV) with 
‘victimization and blacklisting of unions activists’ (Kritsantonis, 1998:514). The 
ratification of the 1971 ILO convention No. 135 giving the right to employees to 
form works councils was belated until 1988 (Jecchinis and Koutroukis, 2001). 
Additionally, the ambitious scheme of ‘socialization’ that the PASOK socialist 
party introduced in the 1980s, aimed at boosting employee participation in 
public sector enterprises, but ended up in total failure (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos, 
2002:103-106).  
Notwithstanding, many aspects of the Greek employment relations system 
have changed in recent years. Compulsory arbitration was abolished, and since 
1992 an independent Arbitration and Mediation Organization (OMED) dealt with 
dispute resolution. At the same time, ‘free collective bargaining’ was 
institutionalized, while the sectoral level of bargaining was officially recognized. 
The main piece of legislation that reformed the collective bargaining system was 
Act 1876/1990 “Free Collective Bargaining and Other Provisions”, which 
established a strict hierarchy of collective agreements. The national collective 
agreement set the minimum wage and other terms and conditions of 
employment and was applicable by default to all workers and employees. Next 
the national and regional sectoral and occupational agreements determined 
terms and conditions at the national (or regional) sectoral and occupational 
levels. The Minister of Labour could extend (by Decree) the collective 
agreements so that they apply to all workers and employees in a specific sector 
or occupation (irrespective of whether they were members of the respective 
trade unions), if the employers who had signed them represented the majority of 
employment in the said sector or occupation. Finally, company unions negotiated 
firm-level agreements. The ‘favorability principle’ was applied across the 
different levels of collective agreements. 
 
The national biennial collective bargaining agreements ‘operated as functional 
equivalents to social concertation’ (Karamessini (2008:49), and the 
establishment, in 1994, of an Economic and Social Committee provided the 
primary venue for social dialogue, although its role remained mainly 
consultative. Trade Unions representatives participated in 140 Committees and 
Councils, while representatives from the employers’ associations are involved in 
more than 60 permanent national level structures (Aranitou and Yannakourou, 
2004). These changes encouraged commentators to speak of the 
‘Europeanization effect’ on social dialogue structures (Tsarouhas, 2008). 
 
Despite these institutional changes that updated the employment relations 
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model during the 1990s, several of the specificities of the Greek model persisted 
alongside subtle processes of liberalization. The extent of undeclared work in the 
underground economy remained exceptionally higher than in CMEs or in LMEs. 
Estimates of the underground economy ranged from 20% to 29% of the GDP 
(Katsios, 2006 ; Schneider, 2005 ; Seferiades, 2003:196) while undeclared work 
is well-over 20% of GDP (Renoy et al., 2004). The segmentation of the Greek 
labour market along three segments (public, private, and informal sector) is a 
widely accepted reality (Karamessini, 1997) and as Zambarloukou (2006:220) 
puts it, the large unofficial economy offered ‘exit mechanisms’ for the firms not 
willing to abide by the institutional framework. Additionally, Greece’s process of 
subtle liberalization can be traced back to the early 1990s with the privatization 
of public sector enterprises and the slimming of the welfare state. As 
Karamessini (2009) argued, Greek capitalism was transformed from a ‘state-led 
familistic’ capitalist model to a more ‘liberal and de-familised’ one. 
 
Contrary to the previous period, institutional change in the current juncture is 
rapid and abrupt. The bailout conditions and the subsequent monitoring by the 
Troika follow the typical neoliberal Washington-consensus conditionality. 
Undoubtedly, these conditions have vast implications for different institutional 
domains such as the welfare regime, the employment relations system or 
product markets regulation. These measures pushed Greece towards a deep 
recession with negative growth rates and unprecedented levels of 
unemployment (Table 2). At the backdrop of this macro-economic environment, 
the next section examines the radical changes that took place in the employment 
relations’ regulation. 
 
Table 2: The Crisis of the Greek Economy (2008-2012) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
Real GDP Growth Rate (% change) -0.2 -3.1 -4.9 -7.1 -6.4 
 
Labour Cost Index (% change) 5.5 0.2 -0.6 -6.0 -9.5 
 
Public Debt (% of GDP) 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.3 156.9 
 
Total Unemployment (%) 7.7 9.5 12.6 17.7 24.3 
 
Youth Unemployment (%) 22.1 25.8 32.9 44.4 55.3 
 
Source: Eurost at. 
28.1 27.6 27.7 31.0 34.6 
 
Population at risk of poverty (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
The Transformation of Employment Relations Regulation in the era of the 
Crisis 
  
In the run-up to the entry to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), there 
were several attempts to alter the existing regulation via social dialogue; 
however, the proposed measures were quite moderate compared to the 
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austerity-era policies (Featherstone, 2011). The 2010 Memorandum, signed by 
the Greek government for the bailout, outlined in general terms those 
fundamental changes in the labour market. The overall aim was to reduce labour 
costs and introduce greater flexibility in the labour market, thus allowing for 
‘cost moderation for an extended period of time’ (IMF, 2010: 59). Wage 
reduction was relatively more feasible in the public sector, because wages were 
unilaterally determined by the Minister of Finance and not negotiated with the 
unions (see Christopoulou and Monastiriotis, 2013: 3-5). However, an analogous 
intervention in the private sector would constitute a breach of free collective 
bargaining processes, and could not be achieved without a fundamental 
restructuring of individual and collective labour law. 
 
The changes in the institutional framework can be divided to two broad 
categories. First, some measures attempted to indirectly moderate labour costs 
through alterations in individual labour law, aiming at the reduction of overtime 
cost and the cost of firing employees, while at the same time introduced 
provisions for the promotion of flexibility and modified the upper limits 
regarding collective redundancies. The second category targeted the collective 
employment relations’ institutions, leading to the decentralization of collective 
bargaining, and the reform of the mediation and arbitration process. The 
common implication of the injection of liberal market elements into the Greek 
model was to reduce labour costs in pursuit of ‘competitiveness’. 
 
 
Introducing Flexibility in Labour Law  
 
The first phase of the institutional changes in employment regulation was 
marked by the attempt to modify the rules governing the individual employment 
contract, and thus, prepare the ground for further deregulation in the labour 
market. The legislation that ratified the bailout was Act 3845/2010 “Measures for 
the Implementation of the Support Mechanism to the Greek Economy from 
Eurozone Member-States and the International Monetary Fund”. This included 
several changes in areas such as the compensation of young employees, the 
policies on dismissals, and on overtime compensation. Moreover, and contrary to 
existing regulations, the Act allowed for the terms and conditions of occupational 
or firm- level collective agreements to deviate from the ones prescribed at the 
industry or national levels. The wording of the provision could effectively abolish 
the national collective agreement and render the industry-level agreements 
redundant (Mpakopoulos, 2010). However, the rulings of the law were quite 
vague and were further specified in later laws or presidential decrees. 
 
The first such specification came through Act 3846/2010 “Guarantees for 
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Employment Security and Other Provisions”, which introduced elements of the so-
called ‘Flexicurity model’. Its primary focus was the re-regulation of the nature, 
conduct and compensation of part-time work, providing on the one hand 
increased security for various flexible forms of employment and, at the same 
time, making it cheaper and easier for an employer to use this non-standard 
employment form, as well as the services of temporary employment agencies. 
Moreover, the law also dealt with the management of working time, conferring 
the right to negotiate working time changes not only to the unions, but also to 
‘associations of employees’. Before this change, this body had quite a restricted 
remit compared to a trade union, as it did not have any rights to negotiate wages 
or to call strikes, and may not have been a representative structure. Under the 
new regime, however, in a company that employs at least 20 employees, an 
association of five employees, (i.e. one-fourth of the staff), can negotiate changes 
in the working time for the whole workforce. 
 
Greater flexibility in working time arrangements was a central concern of the 
employers’ associations. Legislation introduced in 2012 (Act 4093/2012 
“Approval of the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy 2013-2016”) allowed the extension 
of the working week from five to six days and the increase of the working time 
without an increase in compensation for retail employees. Additionally, Act 
4152/2012 “Urgent Measures for the Implementation of Acts 4046/2012, 
4093/2012 and 4127/2012” included a similar working time provision for the 
teachers working in secondary education. 
 
Although Act 3846/2010 laid the ground for the adoption of flexible forms of 
employment, subsequent legislation (Act 3863/2010 “New Pension System and 
Related Provisions, Regulations in Employment Relations”) adopted more direct 
measures. The overtime pay rates were significantly reduced, and the law 
introduced several provisions regarding the compensation of young employees: 
under the new framework, an employer is allowed to hire apprentices aged 15-
18 at wage-rates 30% below the national minimum wage, or to hire young 
workers aged 18-25 at 84% of the national minimum wage. These practices were 
reminiscent of the Contrat Première Embauche that was attempted to be 
introduced in France in 2006 (GSEE, 2011). 
 
The employment protection framework was also altered, making it easier and 
cheaper for companies to lay-off employees. Towards this end, two fundamental 
changes were introduced. First, there was an increase of the upper boundary 
regarding group dismissals. Prior to the new law, companies employing between 
20 and 150 employees were allowed to lay-off up to four employees per month, 
whereas companies with more than 150 employees were allowed to lay-off up to 
2% of their workforce per month. Under the new framework, the former group 
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may lay-off up to six employees per month, and the latter group may lay-off up to 
5% of their workforce per month (but not more than 30 employees). Second, the 
new law introduced important changes in the calculation of the dismissal 
compensation, rendering the whole process much cheaper for the employer. In 
fact, Act 4093/2012 (mentioned above) further simplified and economized the 
redundancy process. 
 
The majority of the above changes reflected attempts to restrain and control 
labour cost by altering several provisions of the existing structure of individual 
labour law. However, they were perceived as inadequate to control the major 
source of labour cost increases. That is why a substantial wave of re-regulation 
targeted the collective bargaining system. 
 
 
The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining 
  
The ultimate aim of the institutional changes in the collective bargaining system 
was to reduce labour costs through controlled decentralization. To this end, the 
government followed two paths: the first concerned its attempt to control the 
level of the national minimum wage, whereas the second focused on the 
decentralization of collective bargaining. 
 
The government exerted indirect pressure to the social actors to negotiate a 
pay-freeze even before the signing of the 2010 Memorandum. The 2010-2012 
national collective agreement introduced real wage cuts, as any increase in the 
national minimum wage was agreed to be based on the Eurozone’s Harmonized 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), which was lower than the national consumer 
price index (CPI). 
 
As mentioned above, the framework governing collective agreements 
supported a centralized bargaining structure. The Troika thus urged for the 
adoption of measures that would decentralize the process and would provide 
greater opportunities to individual employers to manipulate and control the 
labour cost at the company level. Initially, the government adopted Act 
3899/2010 “Urgent Measures of Implementation of the Greek Economy Support 
Mechanism”, which introduced a new type of collective agreement called the 
‘Special Operational Collective Agreement’ (SOCA). The SOCA could be signed 
either by a firm-level union or by the local sectoral trade union or sectoral 
federation, in companies that faced financial strains, and allowed for the 
derogation of wages from the ones agreed at the sectoral level. The rationale 
behind the SOCA was to provide the opportunity to a company facing financial 
problems to adjust its employees’ terms and conditions of employment to the 
market conditions (Leventis, 2011: 98). The ultimate goal was to assist 
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companies in the verge of bankruptcy to survive and, consequently, to preserve 
jobs. 
 
However, this measure was short-lived. In October 2011, amidst a political 
crisis and under the Troika’s pressures pending the loan’s sixth installment, the 
government voted another law that radically changed the employment relations 
system and paved the way for the abolition of sectoral agreements (Act 
4024/2011 “Pension System Regulations, Unitary Salary and Grade Scales, and 
Other Provisions Implementing the Mid-Term Framework of Fiscal Strategy 2012-
2015”). The ‘SOCA’ was abolished, and any firm (not only the ones facing 
financial strains) now had the option to sign a firm -level agreement for the 
duration of the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy (i.e. until 2015), that could prevail 
over the sectoral agreement, even if the former contained worse terms and 
conditions of employment than the latter. In other words, the favorability 
principle was abolished. The firm-level agreement, however, could not contain 
provisions worse than the ones agreed at the national level. Moreover, the 
sectoral or occupational agreements can only be apply to the employees whose 
employers are members of the respective employers association, and cannot be 
extended to all employees of the said sector or occupation, as was the practice 
thus far. 
These two provisions set the bases for the full decentralization of collective 
bargaining, as they allow companies to sign firm-level agreements that are not in 
any way bounded by the wage levels agreed at the sectoral level. To further 
facilitate this move, the new law extended the right to sign collective agreements 
to companies employing less than fifty employees, or to companies with no firm-
level trade unions. In this case, a firm-level agreement may be signed by an 
association of employees, representing at least 3/5 of the company’s employees, 
a right that until now was reserved either for the firm-level unions, or for the 
local or national sectoral unions. Through this provision, the legislation ensured 
that the sectoral unions would be absent from the process, and the employers 
will be able to negotiate the derogation in the terms and conditions of 
employment from the sectoral agreement in the ‘protective environment’ of their 
companies. The establishment of a second negotiating party at the firm level – 
the ‘association of employees’ – further simplifies the process. In cases where a 
trade union is already established in a company, the association of employees 
may constitute an intra-firm rival to the existing structure and prove to be a 
more ‘reliable’ partner to the employer. 
 
The institutional dismantling of the collective bargaining system reached its 
peak in 2012. The government unilaterally decided to introduce a statutory 
regulation of the national minimum wage and to prohibit its increase until the 
unemployment rate falls below 10% (Act 4046/2012 and Cabinet Decision 
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6/2012 “Regulation for the Implementation of Article 1, Paragraph 6 of Act 
4046/2012”). As a result, from April 2013 onwards, the national minimum 
(monthly) wage was reduced by 22% for employees over the age of 25 (from 
€751,39 to €586.08), and by 32% for employees below the age of 25 (from 
€751,39 to €510.95). 
 
 
Reforming the Mediation and Arbitration Procedures 
  
The restructuring of the arbitration process was central in the initial 
Memorandum negotiations and in the Troika’s consequent reports, and revolved 
around two interconnected issues: the elimination of the asymmetry in the 
arbitration process and the need to curb the – supposed – subjectivity of the 
mediators and arbitrators. 
 
According to the older framework (Act 1876/1990), to reach the arbitration 
stage the two parties had to go through the mediation process, and only when 
this had failed the former could be activated. However, in the case of failing 
negotiations at the national, sectoral or occupational level, only the trade unions 
had the right to appeal to arbitration if the employer had rejected the mediator’s 
proposal, or had not participated in the mediation process. Asymmetry, 
therefore, concerned the unilateral right reserved for the unions to appeal to 
arbitration when mediation failed. Act 3899/2010 lifted this union prerogative 
in favor of the employers, also prescribing them the right to resort to arbitration 
if mediation failed. In 2012, Cabinet Decision 6/2012 ruled that resorting to 
arbitration requires the consent of both the employers and the employees.  
The elimination of this ‘inequality’ was a long-standing demand of the 
employer associations. In 2003, for example, the Federation of Industries of 
Northern Greece (SVVE) appealed to the European Court of Justice regarding the 
asymmetry in reaching arbitration. Although the elimination of asymmetry may 
seem to restore a balance in the negotiation process, it actually leads to the 
deterioration of the institution of mediation and creates further imbalance in the 
relations between the two parties. Given the power inequalities embedded in the 
employment relationship, the previous legislation erred towards the labour side, 
reserving the right to unilaterally revert to arbitration for the unions, in case 
they encountered an unbendable employer’s association. This right was, in other 
words, a ‘weapon’ at the hands of the trade unions to persuade the employers to 
take negotiations seriously and to approach the negotiating table in a 
cooperative manner (Kazakos, 1998: 137). To countervail this imbalance, 
however, the legislation suspended the right to strike for ten days from the day 
the unions appealed to arbitration. 
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The extent to which this regulation helped to promote social dialogue is a 
contested issue. Ioannou (1995, 2011) for instance, argued that in many cases 
this framework replicated the old arbitration system as both parties used 
mediation as an intermediate step to eventually reach arbitration. Although this 
has undoubtedly occurred in many cases, presumably in negotiations where the 
perceived conflict between the two parties was so intense that a negotiated 
agreement was impossible to be reached by default, OMED’s data suggest that 
the system of mediation contributed to the signing of agreements between the 
two parties (OMED, 2010: 11). 
 
By lifting unions’ unilateral right to resort to arbitration, however, the law 
provides the opportunity to the employer to override the mediation process and 
resort directly to arbitration, where the arbitrator’s decision is final and binding 
for both parties. The incentive to do so is also provided by the new framework, 
which modified the content of the arbitrator’s decision. Although under the 
previous framework the arbitrator could regulate any aspect of a collective 
agreement – i.e. both its substantive and procedural nature – the new law 
restricts the arbitrator’s ruling only at the regulation of wages, leaving the rest 
substantive issues (such as working hours, benefits, overtime compensation, 
promotions etc.), as well as the procedural ones in the remit of negotiations 
between the parties. Moreover, the arbitrator’s proposal under the new 
framework must take into consideration the financial condition and the 
development of the establishment’s competitiveness, (see Act 3899/2010 and 
Cabinet Decision 6/2012). This last provision actually means that any case 
reaching arbitration will most probably result either to a wage freeze or a wage 
reduction, offering strong incentives to employers to resort to arbitration 
instead of reaching a common agreement with a trade union. In case the unions 
do not consent to arbitration, the employer still retains the right to unilaterally 
reduce wages to the level of the national minimum wage. 
 
Discussion and Analysis 
  
Our review of the institutional changes in the previous section substantiates the 
claim that the Greek system of employment regulation is speedily liberalized. 
However, we contend that this direction of change will not yield the expected 
results, because the changes ignore the path-dependencies and specificities of 
the Greek employment and production model. In other words, the move towards 
liberalization and the obsession with ‘cost competitiveness’ (Hay, 2012) will not 
necessarily lead to any type of comparative advantage. The main reasons is that 
other elements that are conducive to ‘institutional complementarities’ are 
missing and thus ‘non-complementarities’ (Molina and Rhodes, 2007) are likely 
16 
 
to persist. Indeed, one of the primary insights from the varieties of capitalism 
literature is that comparative advantage is embedded in a wider institutional and 
societal context (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Thus, institutions cannot just be 
transplanted from one country to another following a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. 
 
We argue that there are two structural characteristics of the Greek model of 
capitalism that are likely to militate against any potential increase in 
competitiveness. On the one hand, there is a predominance of SMEs that are not 
internationalized and are likely to be unaffected by these changes, whereas the 
informal sector is likely to offer exit mechanisms for those enterprises. On the 
other hand, the internal devaluation policy ignores the characteristics of the 
Greek production model based on limited technological innovation and 
specialized on low value added products. 
 
Despite the less regulated labour market context, employers still retain the 
option to ‘exit’ from the formal economy (Zambarloukou, 2006). The limited 
state capacity to enforce labour law to free -riding companies is likely to increase 
the number of firms opting for that option. As previously mentioned, the shadow 
economy and undeclared work are prevalent features of Greek capitalism. In this 
sphere no law applies, and in the absence of credible sanctions and effective 
disincentives towards undeclared work, the cost-benefit analysis of firms is 
likely to lead them to the ‘low road’ of informality. Negotiating reduced wages 
‘under the table’, or unilaterally imposing wage-cuts, is likely to look much more 
attractive to employers. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is has 
become quite common that employees remain unpaid for several months. Some 
employees are forced to convert into part-time contracts, whilst still working full 
time, so that employers make savings on non-wage labour costs. We argue that 
this trajectory of change is likely to dilute social cohesion.  
Additionally, there are other persistent characteristics of the Greek 
production model that make the institutional changes in the employment 
relations system less likely to produce any comparative advantage. The Troika 
insisted on applying the policy of ‘internal devaluation’ through the systematic 
 
reduction of unit labour costs (see Ioannou, 2012) and this was expected to 
facilitate an outward-oriented export-led growth model. However, this policy 
ignored the specificities and path dependencies of the Greek production model. 
In other words, it ignored the role of ‘structural’ competitiveness (Karamessini, 
2012), which encompasses the type of products (and services) that are produced 
in Greece, their quality (and value added) and how far these match global 
demand (INE -GSEE, 2013). This was further exacerbated by the fact that exports 
did not contribute to a large degree to the gross domestic product, and despite 
the fall in labour costs there was no corresponding fall in the prices of products 
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(INE-GSEE, 2013). This further indicates that profit margins remained wide, 
absorbing some of the labour cost reduction. Overall, we argue that the most 
likely outcome from the institutional changes in employment regulation is sub-
optimal economic performance. 
 
The insights from the varieties of capitalism literature are useful here. The 
two ideal-types of LMEs and CMEs are considered successful, because they have 
a neat coupling of institutional characteristics. For instance, the more 
coordinated employment relations system in Germany is matched by an 
exquisite system of occupational skill-formation (Culpepper, 1999) and strong 
workplace representation rights (Thelen, 2000). Thus, the institutional 
arrangements are likely to facilitate a comparative advantage on high-value 
added products requiring incremental innovation such as machine tools, 
automobile, durable consumer goods, etc. (Hall and Soskice, 2001:43). On the 
other hand, the more deregulated employment relation system in the US is 
matched by a focus on general skills education system (Soskice, 1994). Thus, the 
institutional arrangements are likely to facilitate a comparative advantage on 
products and services requiring radical innovation such as semi-conductors, 
information technology, biotechnology etc. (Hall and Soskice, 2001:43). In the 
case of Greece, the specificities and idiosyncrasies of the Greek capitalist model 
suggest that non-complementarities are likely to persist. Instead, the injection of 
LME elements might lead to what Della Sala has dubbed as an even more 
‘dysfunctional’ model (Della Sala, 2004). On the basis of the above analysis, we 
propose the following hypothesis to be examined by further research: 
 
Hypothesis: Whilst the institutional changes in the Greek employment system 
are aimed at improving the economy’s competitiveness via labour cost 
reduction, they are unlikely to produce any comparative advantage and will 
most likely bring suboptimal economic performance and diluted social cohesion. 
 
Conclusion  In the employment relations system, the current pressures from global financial markets will lik ly intensify the push towards libe alizing the institutions of collective employment regulation. T e Greek m loyment relations system is  as  in point. The s g i g of Memorandum radically alte ed the exi gi titu ions of t  labour mark t, sinc  th  elax t n of th  lim ts in c ll ctive di m ssals; the transf rmation f the pro ess of mediation and arb tr tio , and the d centralization of collective bargaining p ve  the way or the f rth r er glati .
 
In the employment relations system, the current pressures from global 
financial markets will likely intensify the push towards liberalizing the 
institutions of collective employment regulation. The Greek employment 
relations system is a case in point. The signing of the Memorandum radically 
altered the existing institutions of the labour market, since the relaxation of the 
limits in collective dismissals; the transformation of the process of mediation and 
arbitration, and the decentralization of collective bargaining paved the way for 
the further deregulation of the labour market. 
 
In light of the above analysis, it was argued that the changes are unlikely to 
produce ‘comparative advantages’ and increase the competitiveness of the Greek 
economy, because they disregard the specificities and path-dependencies of the 
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Greek model. The changes ignore that Greece entails a sizeable informal sector, 
and that it lacks effective monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms that 
contribute to the prevalence of illegal employment. Given the industrial 
structure, in which small and micro-firms predominate, the changes in the 
collective bargaining system are not readily applicable to them. Even to those 
firms where these changes are applicable, they are more likely to respond in a 
short-termist and path-dependent manner by circumventing the institutional 
framework.  
Additionally, the structure of the Greek economy is traditionally focused on 
producing low-value added products and services, incorporating little 
technological (incremental or radical) innovation. There is a strong inward-
orientation in the production of goods and services, and thus, the exports 
contribute very little to GDP. The focus on labour cost reduction and ‘internal 
devaluation’ is unlikely to yield any results, since the institutional pre-conditions 
for striking an effective comparative advantage are missing. Therefore, the 
liberalization of employment regulation is likely to lead to a dysfunctional 
Liberal Market Economy with the ‘worse of both worlds’: suboptimal economic 
performance and diluted social cohesion. 
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